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1 Overview
Over the past fifteen years, a novel explanatory framework spearheaded by Karl
Friston has inspired both excitement and confusion in the philosophy of biology
and cognitive science. Active inference, whose most famous tenet is the free en-
ergy principle, purports to unify explanations in biology and cognitive science
under a single class of mathematical models. Unfortunately, the framework is
notoriously difficult to understand, hampering efforts at critical evaluation. The
Topical Collection aims to widen the field for proper assessment of active infer-
ence, and this introduction provides a jumping-off point.
There are broadly three reasons why the active inference framework is difficult
to understand. First, the mathematics are unfamiliar to many philosophers, and
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even to biologists and cognitive scientists. Second, the framework was developed
rapidly by a small but dedicated group of researchers, limiting its accessibility
while expanding its scope. Third, the framework makes claims across both math-
ematical and empirical domains, and the dialectical relationships between these
are unclear.
Here we attempt to redress this situation by targeting each source of potential
confusion. First, we offer simplified versions of the models used in active infer-
ence (section 2). Second, we describe the historical trajectory of the framework
and highlight its novel features (section 3). Third, we distinguish three kinds of
claim (labelled mathematical, empirical, and general) that proponents of active
inference make (section 4). We illustrate the ways these kinds of claim are used
to justify one another with reference to papers in the Topical Collection.
Our goal is neither to defend nor attack active inference, but to enable philoso-
phers to pursue more effective critical evaluation. A wider and deeper understand-
ing of the framework is required if it is to be given a proper hearing.
2 Simple models of the free energy principle for in-
ference, action, and selection
2.1 A note on ‘models’
Let us begin with a warning. The word ‘model’ takes on two distinct senses
throughout our discussion. The sense more familiar to philosophers is what we
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will call a scientific model: a representation of some possible or actual system,
which a scientist uses to reason about, or discover features of, that system and
related systems. By contrast, in the active inference literature a narrower sense
is typically meant; what we will call a generative model. This is a mathematical
object with applications in statistics and various sciences. Our simplified models
of the free energy principle are scientific models. They in turn posit generative
models, possessed by agents and employed by them to perform inference and
action.
Note further that some scholars opt for a deflationary stance on generative
models, using them only to describe the dynamics of agents. It is an open question
whether this kind of model building precludes any form of scientific realism about
the relation between the model and the target system. These issues are discussed
in section 4.
In each of our scientific models, the generative model in question takes the
form of a joint probability distribution like p(w,x) or p(w,x,z). If we use the term
‘model’ in isolation, context will be sufficient to indicate which sense is intended.
2.2 A simple model of inference
The inference problem addressed by the active inference framework concerns an
agent who can observe data x and must infer the value of an unobservable state
w. The unobservable state is assumed to cause observable data (Figure 1). The
agent is capable of harbouring beliefs about the unobservable state, and knows the
statistical relationship between it and the observable data, which is represented as
4
Figure 1: The basic model of inference. An agent can observe x and must
infer the value of w. The agent knows the statistical connection between them,
encapsulated by the joint probability distribution p(w,x).
a joint probability distribution p(w,x).
For example, imagine you have a cat that spends its time in either the kitchen
or the bedroom. When it’s in the kitchen, it often meows for food; when it’s in the
bedroom, it often purrs loudly. Suppose you tally the proportion of the times your










The table describes a joint probability distribution p(w,x), where w ranges over
possible cat locations: w ∈ {kitchen, bedroom}, and x ranges over possible cat
sounds: x ∈ {meow, purr}. You can see that 40% of the time the cat is in the
kitchen and meowing, and 30% of the time it is in the bedroom and purring. It
does sometimes mix and match those locations and noises – sometimes it purrs in
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the kitchen or meows in the bedroom – but less frequently. (We are assuming that
the cat cannot be anywhere but the kitchen or the bedroom, that it cannot make
sounds other than meowing or purring, and that it is always making one of these
sounds.)
Now suppose you are in the living room and you hear a meow. You can’t
tell whether the sound came from the kitchen or bedroom, but you do know the
statistics given in the table above. What is the probability of the cat being in one
location or the other, given that you heard it meowing? This is an inference
problem. We will say that you must give your solution in the form of a probability
distribution, which we denote by q(w). This can be said to capture your degrees
of belief – what philosophers sometimes call ‘credences’ – in the two possible
locations of the cat.
Of course, there is a sense in which you already possess a distribution of this
kind. The joint distribution that is your generative model, p(w,x), implies a distri-
bution p(w). But these are your prior credences, the probabilities you implicitly
assign before you hear the cat make a sound. We are asking what probabilities
you should assign – what your credences, represented by q(w), should be – after
hearing a meow.
Many philosophers will be familiar with one famous method for solving this
problem: Bayesian conditionalization. This method can be stated as a principle
saying how an agent using a model p(w,x) ought to choose their beliefs q(w) upon
observing data x:
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BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE: q(w)←− p(w|x)
The left-pointing arrow ←− means, ‘set the value of the thing on the left to the
value of the thing on the right.’ So this statement says, ‘set the value of q(w)
equal to the value of p(w|x)’. We have called this rule BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE




Since the numerator is equal to the joint probability, and the denominator is its




































Upon hearing a meow, according to BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE, you should have 80%
credence that the cat is in the kitchen and 20% credence that it is in the bedroom.
It is worth noting that following BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE is much simpler than
the Bayesian statistical practices performed by many scientists. Usually the sci-
entist aims to improve the accuracy of a generative model of some real-world
phenomenon, which would mean improving the accuracy of p(w,x).1 This learn-
ing task is relatively difficult. It should be distinguished from the simpler task of
estimating w from an observation of x, which is called inference. In the present
example we are assuming for simplicity that the agent’s generative model is al-
1In this case the scientist is employing a generative model as a scientific model.
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ready accurate. We return to this point in section 2.5.
The formalism at the heart of active inference begins with the observation
that it is sometimes impossible to follow BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE. In many of the
situations in which statisticians would like to find p(w|x), the sum ∑w p(w,x) is
computationally intractable so p(x) cannot be calculated. This usually happens
when the state space is continuous rather than discrete, so the sum ∑ becomes an
integral
∫
over an infinite number of points.
In these cases, what is needed instead is a way to choose q(w) so as to make
it close to p(w|x). Even if you cannot formulate the true posterior, you will end
up with a distribution that is optimal given the computational resources at your
disposal.
When this problem is formulated by statisticians, we usually begin with a
family of possible distributions q, and search for the member of that family which
lies as close to p(w|x) as possible. We can do this indirectly by using a measure of
inaccuracy. Active inference employs a measure of inaccuracy called variational
free energy, labelled F . Because it is a measure of inaccuracy, smaller values are
better than larger values. Given a family of candidate distributions q, the best is
the one that produces the lowest value of F . Although the lowest possible value
of F is given by the true posterior p(w|x), that might not be one of the available
distributions q. In that case, the optimal q is the member of the family that yields
the lowest value of F from among the available members.
In short, according to active inference, the goal of inference is to adopt cre-
dences q that minimize variational free energy F . We will now build up to the
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definition of F by giving an intuitive overview of its component parts.
Variational free energy captures two sources of inaccuracy in belief and dic-
tates how they ought to be traded off against one another. The two sources of in-
accuracy are overfitting and failing to explain the data. We will introduce them
in turn before displaying the full definition of F , then showing how it can provide
the same solution to the cat problem as the simpler BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE.
Overfitting. According to lexico.com (2021), overfitting is “The production of
an analysis which corresponds too closely or exactly to a particular set of data, and
may therefore fail to fit additional data or predict future observations reliably.” In
the cat example, the prior p(w) implied by the generative model captures general
statistics about the cat’s location,2 while q(w) is your ‘analysis’; that is, your
belief about its current location. You overfit when you choose a distribution q(w)
that explains the current data very well, but fails to account for the wider range of
statistical possibilities encapsulated by p(w). The cost of overfitting can therefore
be measured by checking how far q(w) diverges from p(w). The first term of F is







This term, which is also called relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence,
2Again, for simplicity we are assuming your generative model accurately captures the ‘true’
statistical facts. Realistically, the prior and the generative model it is derived from can only be
informed by the samples you have managed to take. If there is a true, objective distribution, this
may differ from the generative model. See section 2.5 for more.
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measures how far a distribution q(w) differs from a distribution p(w). When q
and p are identical, they coincide for every value of the sum. In this case the
logarithm is always zero (because log aa = 0) so the total value of the sum is zero.
As q and p get more and more different, the total value of the term increases. To
avoid overfitting, q(w) should be close to p(w).3
Failing to explain the data. Mathematically, ‘explaining the data’ means as-
signing high probability to events w that make the probability of x high. The







Higher values of p(x|w) should be matched with high values of q(w) to keep this
term low.
Variational free energy F is the sum of the penalties for overfitting and failing













to explain the data
(4)
3Note that the base of the logarithm in equation (2) is not important for our exposition. Chang-
ing the base changes the units in which the result is given, from (say) bits (when the base is 2) to
nats (when the base is Euler’s number e, so the logarithm is the natural logarithm ln). Beyond de-
scribing F as a measure of inaccuracy, however, we do not have space to relate its interpretation to
other quantities associated with those terms. Here we leave the base unspecified; in the solution to
the cat problem below we chose e which entails that F and its component penalties are measured
in nats.
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Suppose you happen to choose beliefs q(w) that are identical to p(w). Then the
first term is zero, but the second term may be inordinately high. You have avoided
overfitting at the expense of failing to explain the data. On the other hand, suppose
you happen to choose q(w) such that its high values correspond to high values of
p(x|w). Then the second term remains low, but the first term may be high as a
result. Your beliefs explain the data well at the expense of overfitting. The optimal
value of F occurs when q(w) lies between these two extremes.4 In a moment we
will see how this works in the solution to the cat example. But first we should
address a practical issue with equation (4).
We set up the inference problem by saying that the agent knows the statistics
p(w,x), but might not have access to the marginal distribution p(x). They were
prohibited from following BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE for this reason. However, we
did not address whether the agent has access to the prior p(w) or the likelihood
p(x|w). Since F includes both those terms, one would expect the agent needs
them in order to use F to guide inference. As it turns out, the agent does not need







Given our assumptions so far, the agent has access to all three inputs to F in
4In the active inference literature, the penalty for overfitting is often labelled ‘complexity’. The
penalty for failing to explain the data is usually presented as a reward for explaining the data well;
it is therefore introduced as the negation of the term we use here, and is called ‘accuracy’. Con-
sequently, variational free energy is defined as the difference between complexity and accuracy.
The goal of inference is described as minimizing complexity while maximizing accuracy. Our
presentation is mathematically equivalent.
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equation (5):
• p: A joint distribution over w and x. The agent’s generative model and, in
this simple example, also the true general statistical connection between w
and x.
• q: A distribution over w. The agent’s credences about the unobservable
state, in light of observing a specific piece of data x.
• x: A value of a random variable. The specific piece of data the agent has
just observed.
The inference problem is posed in the following way: given p and x, what should
q be? Considering F as a measure of the inaccuracy of belief, a new principle
suggests itself:





means ‘choose the distribution q that makes the following term as
small as possible’.
Notice that the form of FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (INFERENCE) is the same
as that of BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE. In both cases you are told to perform a calcu-
lation and set q(w) equal to the resulting value. The difference is that BAYESIAN
PRINCIPLE counsels a direct calculation via Bayes’ theorem. In contrast, FREE
ENERGY PRINCIPLE (INFERENCE) counsels what might be called an indirect cal-
culation. You must assess candidate distributions q in order to find the one that
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produces the lowest value of F . Happily, in practice this can be done by trial-
and-improvement rather than trial-and-error. Various algorithms for finding q are
available depending on the details of the generative model (MacKay, 2003, §33).
One of the developments that prefigured active inference was the implementation
of such an algorithm in a neural network (Friston, 2005).
In our cat example, p was given by the table of statistics of cat locations and
noises, and we assumed the observer heard the cat meowing (x = meow). To
solve the cat problem using FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (INFERENCE) we could
use one of the aforementioned algorithms, or simply test lots of different values
of q(w) to see which one produces the lowest value of F in combination with
these values of p and x. Fortunately, the example is so simple that we can draw
a graph of F against q and look for the smallest value (figure 2). The minimum
point is at q(kitchen) = 45 , implying that q(bedroom) =
1
5 . This solution agrees
with that given by BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE. It is important to note, however, that
the situations in which variational inference is most useful are those in which the
graph in figure 2 cannot be drawn. For illustrative purposes, we have here made
use of information that is usually unknown to the agent. Instead, the optimal q
would be found using an algorithm of the kind described above.
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Figure 2: Variational free energy F(p,q,x) as a function of the belief distribu-
tion q(w) when x = meow. The penalty for overfitting takes its minimum value
when q(kitchen) = 0.6 = p(kitchen). That is because choosing a posterior that is
identical to the prior is the extreme opposite of overfitting. The penalty for fail-
ing to explain the data takes its minimum value when probability 1 is assigned
to the cat being in the kitchen. That is because the kitchen is the best explanation
for the cat’s meowing. Variational free energy F takes its minimum value at 0.8
(solid black circle) between the minima of its two component costs. FREE EN-
ERGY PRINCIPLE (INFERENCE) therefore counsels that q(kitchen) = 0.8 = 45 , in
agreement with the solution given by BAYESIAN PRINCIPLE. The code to gener-
ate this graph can be found at https://github.com/stephenfmann/fep.
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2.3 A simple model of action
Now suppose you can perform an action, z, that will place the cat in one of the two
rooms. By changing the hidden state w you can indirectly change future values of
x (figure 3).
Figure 3: The basic model of action. An agent can produce an act, z, in order to
bring about states w that in turn produce outcomes x. Active inference employs a
controversial dual interpretation of p(w) and p(x) as probability distributions and
preference distributions over hidden states and sensory states respectively.
While the previous section dealt with an inference rule – how to choose q(w)
– this section deals with a decision rule – how to choose z. Traditionally, decision
rules stem from measures of preference, which we have not yet introduced. One
of the potentially confusing aspects of active inference is that it treats the statistical
model p as a measure of both probabilities and preferences at the same time.
Later we will discuss possible justifications of this move; for now we assume it is
interpretatively valid, in order to give as smooth an exposition as possible.
Recall that FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (INFERENCE) counsels choosing be-
liefs by minimising a function that measures the cost of inaccuracy. That func-
tion, F , is a sum of two kinds of penalty. Action selection is governed in the same
way, but with a slightly different cost function called expected free energy and
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labelled G. The definition of G is closely related to that of F . The interpretation
of the two penalty terms changes as the formalism is updated to reflect the fact
we are now making measurements over expected future states. Since future states
have yet to be observed, the agent must average over them to obtain expected val-
ues. The penalties are associated with failing to satisfy preferences and failing
to minimize future surprise.
Failing to satisfy preferences. q(w|z) is the assumed distribution over hidden
states given our action. If we place the cat in the bedroom, where do we expect it
to be? p(w) is now a preference distribution over hidden states. The first penalty
term in G is a measure of how far the expected distribution of hidden states di-






Compare equation (2). Again this is relative entropy, a standard way to measure
the divergence of one distribution from another.
Not only is it unusual to treat p as a preference distribution, it is unusual to
treat the goal of decision-making to produce a distribution that matches that dis-
tribution, rather than maximising expected utility. So perhaps it is best to keep in
mind that ‘preference’ in this sense might mean something different from ‘utility’
in the traditional sense.
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Failing to minimize future surprise. One of the tenets of active inference is
that agents should act to ensure that future data are not too surprising. The second
penalty term of G therefore measures how surprising future data would be, on








Compare equation (3). In addition to conditionalizing on z, this term also changes
from calculating the logarithm directly to calculating its expectation over x. That
is because x is here a future sensory state: we do not yet know what it will be,
so we must employ its expected value. As a result, the inner term that begins
with ∑x is the entropy of X – the expected surprise of your future observations –
given that a certain hidden state w occurs.5 You want this inner term to be low.
To do this, you should aim to bring about hidden states that lead to predictable
observations. That means you should perform acts that give a high value to q(w|z)
when w produces a low value for that inner term.













Penalty for failing to minimize
expected surprise of future data
(8)
5Although ∑x p(x|w) log 1p(x|w) is an entropy term composed from a conditional probability, it
is not synonymous with conditional entropy, which has a different definition.
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The third input to G is z rather than x. As mentioned above, this is because we
are calculating the expected value over possible future sensory states, rather than
inferring on the basis of a sensory state that has just occurred.
As with F , the measure G suggests a principle:6
FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (ACTION): z←− argmin
z
G
In the same sense that FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (INFERENCE) approximates
Bayesian inference, it has been suggested that minimizing expected free energy
can be read as an approximation of optimal Bayesian design and Bayesian deci-
sion theory.7
It is worth restating just how unusual it is to interpret p as a measure of both
probabilities and preferences. There is nothing wrong with treating a distribution
as a measure of preferences: distributions don’t demand to be interpreted as proba-
bilities, after all. But what is unorthodox, and in need of justification, is giving the
very same mathematical term two different interpretations within the same equa-
tion. One thing worth noting is that in communication theory, p(x) is a probability
and log 1p(x) is a measure of cost (specifically: the number of binary symbols you
are required to expend in order to encode an outcome x, whose probability is p(x),
under the assumption that your code is optimised for the distribution p). These are
the components of entropy, H(X) = ∑x p(x) log
1
p(x) , which can be interpreted as
6Some treatments suggest variations on this principle e.g. Smith et al. (2021, Table 2, pp. 50-
58). Here we have chosen the simplest possible form of action selection in order to highlight the
concepts involved.
7Claims about these links have been impressed upon us by proponents of active inference, but
at time of writing we have not investigated them in the kind of detail required to endorse or reject
them. For textual resources relating to these claims see for example Da Costa et al. (2020, §7).
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the uncertainty about the outcome of event X and as the optimal expected cost of
encoding the outcome. We are not aware of proponents of active inference taking
this interpretive line, but it appears to be a viable option.
Finally, let us present a solution to the cat example. For the problem to have
a determinate solution we need a conditional distribution q(w|z). Let’s suppose
that if we put the cat in the kitchen it usually stays there, but if we put it in the
bedroom it tends to wander:
q(kitchen|put cat in kitchen) = 9
10
q(bedroom|put cat in kitchen) = 1
10
q(bedroom|put cat in bedroom) = 5
10
q(kitchen|put cat in bedroom) = 5
10
We obtain two different values of G, corresponding to the two different possible
acts z (figure 4). The smallest expected free energy results from putting the cat
in the bedroom, so that is what you ought to do according to FREE ENERGY
PRINCIPLE (ACTION).
The duality between probability and preference can be made a little more intu-
itive with another example. Suppose you take your cat’s temperature three times
a day for several weeks. If your cat is healthy, you will end up with a frequency
distribution whose points fall between 38.1◦C and 39.2◦C. Now suppose you are
20
Figure 4: Expected free energy G(p,q,z) when putting the cat in the kitchen
or bedroom. The value of G is lowest when z = bedroom, so FREE ENERGY
PRINCIPLE (ACTION) dictates that that is where you should put the cat. The sur-
prise penalty for both acts is about the same, because in either case you can-
not be very certain about whether the cat will be meowing or purring at the
next time step. However, the preference penalty for putting the cat in the bed-













. Intuitively: if you want the cat to
spend roughly equal time in both places, you shouldn’t put it in the kitchen,
because it will stay there. The code to generate this graph can be found at
https://github.com/stephenfmann/fep.
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asked what you would prefer your cat’s temperature to be in future. Assuming
you want your cat to continue being healthy, you would prefer that its temperature
fall within the range defined by this distribution.
There are at least two reasons why this interpretation should be distinguished
from utilities as decision theory traditionally understands them. First, you should
not simply prefer that your cat always be the temperature that happens to occur
most often according to the frequency distribution. Healthy functioning entails
some fluctuation of temperatures throughout the day. The goal is not to maximise
the value of this distribution, but to match future event frequencies to it. Second,
preferences are just one consideration that must be taken into account when choos-
ing actions. The preference penalty must be balanced against the surprise penalty.
The tension between exploiting your circumstances to achieve your goals and ex-
ploring your circumstances to gain a better understanding of how acts produce
outcomes enables some of the more complex applications of active inference.
One of the ways proponents of the framework turn this unusual interpretation
to their advantage is by casting action as a form of inference:
The mechanism underlying [minimizing expected free energy] is for-
mally symmetric to perceptual inference, i.e., rather than inferring the
cause of sensory data an organism must infer actions that best make
sensory data accord with an internal representation of the environ-
ment.
Buckley et al. (2017), emphasis added
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Hence the name ‘active inference’. The treatment of action as inference in dis-
guise helps avoid perceived problems with purely utility-based theories of decision-
making (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015). By starting with an inference problem in the
form of expected free energy minimization, preferences emerge as the first term
of equation (8). But attempting to achieve these preferences must be balanced
against the second term, which explicitly counsels minimizing future surprise.
Proponents take this to be both more general and more principled than traditional
behavioural theories, which employ utility functions alone (DeDeo, 2019).
Further aspects of the duality between action and perception are brought to
the fore by Friston’s more recondite work on selection dynamics. We now turn to
these deeper themes.
2.4 A simple model of selection
In our model x and z are the inputs and outputs of the agent. The set {x,z} is
called the agent’s Markov blanket. This term is derived from Judea Pearl’s work
on statistical inference using Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1988). Roughly, in Pearl’s
sense the ‘Markov blanket’ of a focal node is the set of nodes that provide total
information about the focal node. However, Markov blankets have taken on a spe-
cial usage within active inference (Bruineberg et al., 2021). In the sense required
here, a Markov blanket can be understood as the set of nodes that ‘screen off’ the
agent from nodes considered external to it. Using the concept of a Markov blan-
ket, Friston has developed an account of selection based on a fundamental claim
about free energy. He claims that Markov blanket systems that persist over time
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within certain kinds of (mathematically defined) environments will come to act in
a manner that can be interpreted as minimizing F via inference and minimizing G
via action.
Another toy model will help illustrate. Consider an agent whose surface tem-
perature x can safely lie between -4 and 4 units. If it drops to -5 or increases to 5, it
dies. The external state w controls whether the temperature increases or decreases
by 1 unit at the next timestep. The agent’s preference distribution over available
temperatures might look something like this:
x




 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.06 0.02 0.01 0
0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.06 0.02 0.01 0

(9)
Notice that the value of w does not affect the agent’s preferences: all the agent
directly cares about is its surface temperature, denoted by x. That is why the two
rows are identical.
Suppose the agent can act to affect the external state. We will say it can try to




z =−1 =⇒ p(w|z) = (0.95, 0.05)
z =+1 =⇒ p(w|z) = (0.05, 0.95)
Given this set-up and the model in figure 3 we have an agent who will survive if
and only if it keeps x within a certain bound. When the temperature is high, it
would be best for the agent to act with z = −1. When the temperature is low, it
would be best for the agent to act with z =+1.
To make the appropriate causal link between the current surface temperature
and the act, the agent needs to employ an inner state y. It can initiate two strategies:
p(y|x) for inference, and p(z|y) for action. Let us allow the inner state to also take
the values {−1, +1}. Then the question that active inference attempts to answer
is, what can we say about the strategies of successful agents?
We will simulate the problem using two agents: a smart agent who tries to
increase low temperatures and decrease high temperatures, and an oblivious agent
who acts randomly. The smart agent sets y = +1 if x <= 0, and y = −1 other-
wise. The random agent chooses y by flipping a coin. Both agents set the act to
be identical to the inner state, so in this simple case there is no difference between
inference and action. In order to calculate variational free energy, we would usu-
ally need to make a choice about how the inner state y corresponds to a probability
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distribution over the external state q(w). However, because p(w,x) has identical
rows, the value of free energy is the same no matter what q is chosen. The only
thing that affects F is therefore x.
Results from a single run are shown in figures 5 and 6. The smart agent keeps
values of x mostly between -1 and 1, which keeps F slightly above 2 nats. The
random agent quickly spirals away from the optimal sensory states, and its F
increases to values much higher than those for the smart agent. After 42 timesteps
the random agent dies: its value for x reached 5, and since p(w,5) = 0 for both
values of w, its free energy takes an infinite value.
Figure 5: Variational free energy over time for an agent that controls
its external state in a survivable manner. The agent’s control over its ex-
ternal state is 95% accurate; occasionally its grasp slips and free energy in-
creases beyond the average. The code to generate this figure can be found at
https://github.com/stephenfmann/fep.
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Figure 6: Variational free energy over time for an agent that acts randomly.
After 42 timesteps the agent dies. The code to generate this figure can be found at
https://github.com/stephenfmann/fep.
27
The correspondence between high values of F and life-threatening states leads
to a third form of the free energy principle:
FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION): any system that survives
long enough will act so as to appear to be minimizing F .
This is not a normative principle – not a suggestion to agents regarding how they
should perform inference – but a means of describing how agents behave. In
recent work Friston gives a deflationary interpretation on which agents do not in
fact minimize anything, but perform acts which can be interpreted as minimizing
F . That is the reason for the emphasized phrase ‘so as to appear to be minimizing
F’. Despite this deflationary approach, there is a link between this and the earlier
principle. Agents subject to FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (INFERENCE) ought to
minimize F , so if this ‘ought’ is tied to their survival, then the normative principle
has the same underlying justification as the descriptive principle.
FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION) interprets p as a kind of fitness func-
tion in the form of a probability distribution over sensory states. When we mea-
sured the temperature of our cat, we obtained a frequency distribution that acted
both as a description of what happened when the cat was previously healthy and
as a prescription of what temperatures the cat should have if we want it to re-
main healthy. FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION) expands the scope of this
intuition, from cats to every biological system, and from temperature to every
measurable property. Supposing our smart and oblivious agents stood at the end
of a long line of evolved organisms, the probability distribution given by the ta-
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ble in (9) could be constructed from the frequencies with which those ancestors
found themselves in the relevant states. What is important here is that only direct
ancestors count for tallying the frequencies. Cousins of direct ancestors may have
found themselves in the state x = 5, but they immediately died. The event does
not count towards the tally because it is not survivable. As a result, necessarily
p(w,x) = 0 when x is an unsurvivable state.
The principle seems to imply that parts of the system (or the system-environment
pairing) will come to correspond to the component terms of F . The way those
parts change over time will correspond to F getting smaller. However, in this toy
case, the inner state y cannot obviously be interpreted as corresponding to a dis-
tribution q because q does not affect the value of F . What is doing the work in
this example is the definition of p(w,x): because states that are not survivable are
assigned probability zero, their variational free energy is infinitely large. In this
case, FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION) captures the rather banal point that
systems can only ever occupy survivable states. If you are likely to be in states
your successful ancestors were in, then you are likely to be successful. Variational
free energy contains a reciprocal of p(w,x); consequently, high values of p(w,x)
produce low values of F . Indeed, any function that contains this reciprocal (or its
logarithm) as a component will be infinite when the probability is zero.
What, then, is the rationale for choosing variational free energy as the function
we should interpret organisms as minimizing?
Ultimately, organisms are said to be acting so as to minimize the surprisal of x,
defined as log 1p(x) . But there are said to be limitations on the ability to minimize
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surprisal ‘directly’, meaning that variational free energy must be used as a proxy.
It is easy to show that variational free energy is an upper bound on surprisal.8 But
any number of functions are upper bounds on surprise. In the literature, differ-
ent and not obviously compatible reasons are given for the move from minimiz-
ing surprise to minimizing variational free energy. From a purely mathematical
perspective, we can outline the set of systems for which surprisal is difficult to
evaluate (MacKay, 2003, pp. 358 ff.): they are high-dimensional. So proponents
of FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION) seem committed to the claim that the
systems it refers to are high-dimensional systems. But the justifications given in
the literature do not obviously line up with this. As part of justifying the hypothe-
sis that the visual system minimizes variational free energy, Friston (2002, p. 118)
asserts that “nonlinear mixing may not be invertible [...]. For example, no amount
of unmixing can discern the parts of an object that are occluded by another.” On
the other hand, Hohwy gives an informal account of what a creature would have
to ‘know’ in order to perform Bayesian inference:
There is no way the creature can assess directly whether some par-
ticular state is surprising or not, to do that it would have to do the
impossible task of averaging over an infinite number of copies of it-
self (under all possible hypotheses that could be entertained by the
model) to see whether that is a state it is expected to be in or not.




p(x) . The first term is a relative
entropy, which by Jensen’s inequality is always greater than or equal to zero (Cover and Thomas,
2006, p. 28). Therefore F ≥ log 1p(x) .
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Hohwy (2013, p. 52)
Hohwy gives a very different rationale from Friston. Neither obviously corre-
sponds to the purely mathematical justification of avoiding an intractable calcula-
tion over many dimensions. Hohwy’s account seems to describe something along
those lines, but that does not entail that the only viable solution is variational in-
ference. Nor is it clear that real organisms are faced with the problem Hohwy
describes.
In each of the three examples discussed in this section, there has been a distinct
role for the distribution p, and thus a distinct interpretation of each model:
1. In our first model, p was a generative model employed by an agent. It was
therefore interpreted as representing probabilities.
2. In our second model, in addition to representing probabilities, p measured
the desirability of certain future states over others. It was therefore inter-
preted as representing preferences.
3. In our third model, p tallied the historical frequencies of a set of (hypothet-
ical) ancestors. It was therefore interpreted as representing the fitness of
different states.9
Supporters of the framework often point to the third role to explain how p can
simultaneously fulfil the first two. A historical tally of successful states denotes
9Sprevak (2020, §6.3) convincingly argues that Friston invokes two distinct senses of free
energy, which here correspond roughly to roles 1 and 3. Sprevak cites Colombo and Wright
(2018) as drawing a similar distinction. Williams (2021) distinguishes descriptive and explanatory
versions of the free energy principle, seemingly tracking the same issue.
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probabilities (i.e. ancestral frequencies) and preferences (i.e. future expected fit-
ness). However, it does not immediately follow that the sense in which successful
organisms appear to minimize F is relevantly similar to the sense in which (for
example) predictive processing systems actually minimize F (see section 3). Or-
ganisms are said to “entail a generative model” (Ramstead et al., 2021, p. 111)
as a consequence of existing, whereas predictive processing systems are said to
employ a generative model that gets updated through prediction error minimiza-
tion. It is not yet clear what warrants treating these two kinds of system in the
same way. The organism that entails a generative model, and whose actions entail
minimizing free energy with respect to that model, is like the ball bearing that
entails a measure of gravitational potential energy, and whose ‘actions’ – falling
to the lowest point in its local region – entail minimizing gravitational potential
energy. From the fact that a ball bearing can be treated as though it were attempt-
ing to minimize gravitational potential energy, it does not follow that a unified
framework can be developed encompassing the ball and (for example) a species
of animal that always seeks the lowest point in its local area in order to evade
predators. Entities that employ representations to act successfully are distinct in
an important way from entities that can be treated as if they employ representa-
tions as a consequence of the effects of physical laws.
In sum, there is a disconnect between the two major domains in which the
free energy principle is usually said to apply. The disconnect must be addressed if
philosophers – even those with mathematical inclinations – are to properly evalu-
ate the active inference framework.
32
2.5 Extensions to the models: more things to learn, more ways
to act
If you open a random journal article in the active inference tradition, its scientific
models – comprising agents who employ generative models to solve problems in
their environments – will likely be much more complex than ours. Over the last
decade much effort has been devoted to extending and adapting these basic models
in order to fit them to empirical data. Active inference models can be augmented
seemingly indefinitely. Some examples follow.
We assumed that p(w,x) denoted both the agent’s generative model and the
true statistical connection between unobserved state and observable data. Real-
istically, agents do not have perfect knowledge of these statistics. There are two
ways to generalize the situation in this regard. First, agents can learn to improve
their estimates of p(w). Second, agents can learn the causal relationship p(x|w).
Since p(w,x) = p(w)p(x|w), this offers two distinct routes to learning a more ac-
curate statistical model. Some of Friston’s early work is geared towards showing
that these statistics can be learned by employing algorithms that minimize varia-
tional free energy through methods known as empirical Bayes (Friston, 2005).
We also assumed that there was a single cause, w, of sensory data. Realisti-
cally, the external world is a panoply of criss-crossing causal paths. An adequate
generative model would contain terms representing at least some of the interac-
tions between unobservable states. Active inference captures these features by
treating agents as employing hierarchical models of their external worlds. The
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first level of the hierarchy x is the sensory data, the second level w1 represents
whatever causes sensory data, the third level w2 represents whatever causes w1,
and so on.
The simplest models assume that the agent is correct about all these features.
The more features the agent can be incorrect about, the more features it is able
to learn, and the more complex the generative model and method of updating. In
principle, agents could be uncertain about any aspect of their representation of the
world, so every model component can be subject to updating in light of evidence.
Furthermore, in principle, the hierarchy of external causes is not restricted to a
certain number of levels. Scientific models of agents performing active inference
can therefore be extended indefinitely. This might be considered a problem when
it comes to justifying the view: if the active inference framework can be extended
to fit any empirical phenomenon, then there needs to be some principled way to
assess the framework, other than by fitting it to data. More broadly speaking, the
worry is that we cannot empirically confirm or dis-confirm scientific models that
can, in principle, explain all possible states of affairs.
Regarding action, instead of a single act z the framework enables decisions
about sequences of acts. Such sequences are called policies and are usually la-
belled π . Expected free energy can be calculated across an entire policy in order
to determine which sequence of acts is optimal. Our model used only a single act,
which is equivalent to a policy that is evaluated at the next time step only.
A great deal of extra complexity can be added to the story about Markov blan-
kets (Friston, 2013). The FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION) is usually
34
introduced with more complex mathematical terms like ergodic densities (Fris-
ton, 2013), solenoidal flows (Aguilera et al., 2021), nonequilibrium steady-state
(Ramstead et al., 2018), and so on. One issue is whether or not this complexity is
really needed to justify FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION). We saw above
that a simple toy system will obey the principle by virtue of the definition of p. If
proponents are aiming at a more precise claim, then perhaps the extra complexity
is necessary. Some work along those lines is already tempering enthusiasm about
the generality of the principle (Aguilera et al., 2021); on the other hand, propo-
nents are working hard to deliver pure mathematical results that can be evaluated
in isolation from biological hypotheses (Da Costa et al., 2021; Friston, 2019; Fris-
ton and Ao, 2012; Friston et al., 2014). Active inference is a work in progress and
should be evaluated as such.
3 A brief history of the free energy principle
The free energy principle is a modern incarnation of ideas that have been raised
sporadically over at least the last five decades. It combines traditions from physics,
biology, neuroscience and machine learning.
3.1 Variational free energy from physics to predictive process-
ing
Although the term ‘variational free energy’ used in active inference has a purely
statistical meaning, it first appeared in physics, where it has a sense connected to
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the more familiar physical meaning of energy. The term is used to help determine
the states of certain physical systems (MacKay, 2003, §33.1), (MacKay, 1995, p.
191 n. 1). In statistical mechanics, many systems have states whose probabilities
are functions of their energies. For example, a state with very high energy might
have a low probability of obtaining, and vice versa. However, the functions p that
describe exactly how probability depends on energy can be very complex. Cal-
culating the statistical properties of such systems is computationally intractable
(MacKay, 2003, p. 423). Adequate approximations can be found by defining
simpler probability functions q and then minimizing variational free energy. The
name arises from the fact that F is related to an existing term called “free energy”
(MacKay, 2003, p. 423) – which explicitly denotes the more familiar physical
sense of ‘energy’.
Variational methods were first deployed in physics, most famously by Feyn-
man (1972).10 By the 1980s it had become clear that techniques from statistical
physics could be adopted in machine learning (Fahlman et al., 1983; Hopfield,
1982) (Hofstadter, 1985, pp. 654–9). By at least 1989 Hinton and colleagues
were referring to free energy in a purely statistical sense (Dayan et al., 1995;
Hinton, 1989; Hinton and van Camp, 1993; Neal and Hinton, 1998). The term
‘variational free energy’ came to mean ‘the function that must be minimized in
order to improve your approximation of a system’s statistical properties’, even
though physical energy was no longer the feature that determined those statistical
10We have unfortunately found it difficult to identify the terms in Feynman (1972) that corre-
spond to the terms subsequently used in machine learning and active inference. Nonetheless, it is
common to see Feynman’s book cited in this connection.
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properties. The systems in question were no longer ‘physical’ systems: they were
sets of inputs to an automated inference engine whose job was to reconstruct the
causes of those inputs (MacKay, 1995). Some of the methods developed in this
body of work became known as ‘variational Bayesian inference’ or just ‘varia-
tional Bayes’, because of the relationship with Bayes’ rule discussed in section 2.
These techniques continue to be used, and are now a standard method in statistics
and machine learning (Bishop, 2006, §10.1). Variational free energy is sometimes
called an ‘objective function’, which is the general name for a term that must be
minimized (or maximized) to solve an inference task.
Because forerunners of these methods were implemented in neural network
models, the question of biological plausibility was often raised (Hinton, 1989,
p. 143) (Dayan et al., 1995, pp. 899–900). But the most successful neural mod-
els were perhaps those spawned by the predictive processing tradition. Predictive
processing was inspired by predictive coding, a technique in communications en-
gineering (Elias, 1955). In the 1980s and 1990s neuroscientists began investigat-
ing its plausibility as a model of visual perception (Kawato et al., 1993; Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Srinivasan et al., 1982). In the early 2000s, Friston (2002, p. 131)
claimed that a predictive processing system could be constructed that performs
variational inference (see also Friston, 2003, pp. 1339–40).
Very roughly, we can understand the relationship between these aspects in
terms of Marr’s hierarchy, which is usually said to have three levels: computa-
tional, algorithmic, and implementational (Marr, 1982). In Friston’s scientific
model of predictive processing, the computation is variational inference. The al-
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gorithm is the expectation-maximisation algorithm, a two-step process whereby
two different mathematical operations are performed iteratively. Neal and Hinton
(1998) had already shown that a version of that algorithm minimizes variational
free energy. Friston claimed the algorithm could be implemented by the activities
of (and structural relations between) individual neurons (for a simplified example
see Bogacz, 2017, §§2-3).
As part of this work, Friston (2003, 2005) began to make strong claims about
the generality of his scientific model. He also cited empirical evidence that sup-
posedly matched model behaviour. This generality, and concordance with data,
led him to develop the free energy principle.
3.2 Free energy minimization as a general principle
Most proponents of predictive processing assert relatively modest claims. Friston
began similarly, claiming we have evidence to believe the visual cortex imple-
ments a hierarchical generative model with variational free energy as the objective
function (Friston, 2003). By 2006, however, he extrapolated from this position to
the much stronger claim that minimizing free energy is almost everything the brain
does (Friston et al., 2006). Not only inferential processes, but also action, were
said to be geared towards minimizing free energy. He reached these conclusions
seemingly by extending earlier predictive processing models and identifying em-
pirical phenomena they faithfully mimic.
By 2012, Friston was asserting that minimizing free energy is almost every-
thing every biological system does (Friston, 2012, 2013) (earlier examples of
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claims of this kind appear in Friston and Stephan (2007)). Rather than being
based on extensions to existing scientific models, this generalized claim is based
rather on considerations of selection (section 2.4). It is worth emphasizing that
the proposed justification for the biological version of the free energy principle
is different from the justification of the original, brain-related claims. Originally,
the principle was a claim about the generality of scientific models of predictive
processing. Gershman (2019) has noted that the free energy principle inherits
some justification from the explanatory success of those models, which have been
discussed extensively in the literature on computational cognitive neuroscience
(Huang et al., 2019; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Wiese and Metzinger, 2017), theoret-
ical neuroscience (Abbott and Dayan, 2005, §10.2) and philosophy (Cao, 2020;
Clark, 2013). In contrast, the biological version of the claim relies on a priori
justification via mathematical proofs of statements like FREE ENERGY PRINCI-
PLE (SELECTION). There is no pre-existing scientific modelling practice whose
success extends to active inference here. Proponents must find empirical support
themselves.
The past decade has seen applications and elaborations of active inference for
biology. Calvo and Friston (2017) apply the framework to plant activity. Tschantz
et al. (2020) simulate bacterial chemotaxis, and give an active inference interpre-
tation. Three contributions to the present Topical Collection discuss E. Coli in an
active inference context: Corcoran et al. (2020); Kirchhoff and van Es (2021);
and Kiverstein and Sims (2021). Baltieri and Buckley (2019) argue that a cer-
tain kind of control process called Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) control,
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which has been used to explain the behaviour of bacteria and amoebae, can be un-
derstood in terms of active inference. The question for philosophers is what theo-
retical or explanatory virtues result from applying active inference in this way. In
section 4 we discuss the dialectical structure of active inference, highlighting key
questions philosophers need to ask in order to evaluate the framework.
4 Dialectic: the free energy principle and related
claims
4.1 Mathematical, empirical, and general claims
Part of the difficulty understanding the body of work associated with the free en-
ergy principle is a lack of transparency over the dialectic. We think a great deal of
confusion can be overcome by considering three kinds of claim. First, there are
mathematical claims. These are claims about the status of theorems, features of
scientific models and statistical techniques. Some of the core mathematical fea-
tures of active inference predate the framework itself (section 3); however, Friston
and colleagues have since introduced many novel mathematical elements. Impor-
tantly, claims in this category do not need to be interpreted as statements about real
systems in order to be evaluated. Second, there are empirical claims about cogni-
tive and biological mechanisms, how brains and bodies actually work. These are
the remit of cognitive neuroscience and biology. Third, there are general claims
that typically abstract across a wide class of empirical claims. Active inference
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grew out of an increasingly generalized explanatory approach to cognition, such
that its central claims crossed over from the empirical to the general category.
When these categories are distinguished, it is easier to see the dialectical re-
lationship between their constituent claims, and to delineate specific topics for
investigation. For example, discoveries about neural network capabilities (math-
ematical) are sometimes used to justify hypotheses about neural organisation in
biological brains (empirical). Such arguments are not restricted to the free en-
ergy program, but are part of a broader disciplinary movement known as com-
putational cognitive neuroscience (Gregory Ashby and Helie, 2011). Similarly,
general claims are sometimes used to justify the relevance of empirical claims, by
providing reason to believe that all biological systems minimize free energy. And
mathematical claims support general claims when mathematical theorems and sci-
entific models are argued to be widely applicable to real biological systems.
In the remainder of this subsection we describe each category in more detail
and highlight key claims in each. In the following subsection we outline dialecti-
cal links between categories. Throughout, we use Hamilton’s rule – which will be
familiar to philosophers of biology – to illustrate the different categories and their
relationships. Hamilton’s rule can be construed as a mathematical claim when in-
terpreted as a statement as part of a mathematical model. It can also be construed
as a general claim when interpreted as a statement about conditions on selection
for genes influencing social behaviour in real populations. And the rule can guide
the verification of empirical claims about the mechanisms of social behaviour, e.g.
the genetic control of parental behaviour towards offspring.
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4.1.1 Mathematical claims
Mathematical claims are statements about mathematical models and objects. This
category contains all of the formal statements deployed as part of modelling prac-
tices in biology and cognitive science, including mathematical claims relating to
active inference. For example, assertions about the computational abilities of neu-
ral networks belong to this category, as long as such claims do not mention the
explanatory power of neural networks with regard to brains.
To take an example better known to philosophers of biology, Hamilton’s rule
states the conditions under which genes for certain kinds of socially-oriented be-
haviour would be favoured by selection. In essence, Hamilton’s rule is a math-
ematical statement constructed as part of a model of an evolving population. It
can be evaluated – i.e. proven, and have its proof checked – without recourse to
real systems. Because of the way the mathematical model is defined, it is not nec-
essary that there be any real examples of selection for Hamilton’s rule to be true
within its mathematical context.11
For an example from active inference, the claim that a small neural network is
capable of minimizing variational free energy via encoding prediction error is ver-
ifiable by actually building such a network, as Bogacz (2017, §§2-3) shows. Re-
cent models of variational message passing constitute similar claims, with message-
passing being a distinct way to minimize variational free energy (Parr et al., 2019)
– a different implementation and algorithm, but the same computation. Similarly,
11We are here using the term ‘mathematical model’ to mean very roughly a scientific model that
need not have a real system as its target.
42
it is possible to verify the claim that variational inference approximates Bayesian
inference by demonstrating that variational free energy takes its lowest value when
the true posterior is used.
Friston makes a number of claims that can be evaluated mathematically. But
the formal framework he employs is idiosyncratic, and based upon work that is
already complex. These novel claims are difficult to assess for philosophers, even
those of us with a mathematical background. The good news is that because the
mathematical claims are screened off from questions about realism and model in-
terpretation, they can be evaluated in isolation. Indeed, the mathematics of active
inference are still being developed (Da Costa et al., 2021), so it is possible that
it currently lacks a coherent, comprehensive formalism. Proponents have pointed
out to us that that is the state of many early sciences: often mathematical rigour
comes after scientific discovery and theory-building.
The term ‘free energy principle’ is sometimes used to denote a purely mathe-
matical statement (see for example Friston and Stephan, 2007, p. 434). Andrews’s
contribution to this Topical Collection endorses this usage. Their opponents are
those that critique the free energy principle under the assumption that it is truth-
apt. Andrews contends that the principle is not truth-apt, because as a set of
mathematical tools it does not by itself entail any empirical claims. For exam-
ple, Andrews claims that “when we take the existence or qualities of a model to
constitute knowledge of the natural world we make a category error and reify the
model” (Andrews, 2021, p. 14). Interestingly, Andrews downplays the relevance




Empirical claims are statements about the structure, function and operation of
real biological systems. For example, the claim that the mammalian visual system
works via prediction error feedback is an empirical claim. With regard to main-
stream biology this is probably the largest category. Most experimental science
and fieldwork is geared towards gathering evidence to establish or refute empirical
claims.
Different empirical claims can comprise specific instances of the same gen-
eral claim. For example, Bourke (2014, Table 1, p. 3) presents a diverse list of
socially-oriented behaviours across a variety of species, some of which can be
explained with respect to Hamilton’s rule. Although Hamilton’s rule does not
mention particular behaviours (nor even particular species), empirical claims can
be seen as instantiations of the more abstract rule.
Similarly, although the active inference framework does not mention specific
systems, we can ask whether its features are instantiated in particular cases. The
empirical category includes specific features of brain activity that have been ar-
gued to be better explained by appeal to minimisation of free energy. For example,
Friston and Stephan (2007, p. 429) claim that the brain uses a mean-field approx-
imation to minimize free energy. This claim is empirical because it is in princi-
ple verifiable: either the brain possesses structures corresponding to the different
components of a mean-field approximation that change according to the dynamics
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of free energy minimization, or it does not. The importance of computational cog-
nitive neuroscience is that it provides methods for assessing and verifying claims
like these.
Both Corcoran, Pezzulo and Hohwy’s and Kiverstein and Sims’s contribu-
tions to this Topical Collection make empirical claims about the nature of allosta-
sis, and both are interested in demarcating behaviour that is distinctively cognitive.
Corcoran et al. (2020) use the free energy principle to conclude that the term ‘cog-
nition’ should be reserved for organisms that engage in counterfactual inference,
and hence that allostasis is not properly cognitive. Kiverstein and Sims (2021)
disagree. On their reading of the free energy principle, what they call “allostatic
control” is a properly cognitive process. The range of organisms to which the term
‘cognition’ applies thus extends beyond those that have a nervous system. In both
cases, these claims are in principle verifiable: either allostasis operates according
to the dynamics of free energy minimisation, or it does not. If, for instance, it turns
out that allostasis operates according to the dynamics of reinforcement learning,
then free energy treatments are in error.12
At the same time, empirical claims are sometimes used to justify aspects of
the modelling framework. The problem is that there has been no independent ver-
ification of the soundness of these connections. For example, Friston and Stephan
(2007, p. 432) assert, “At the level of perception, psychophysical phenomena sug-
gest that we use generalised coordinates, at least perceptually: for example, on
12Here we assume reinforcement learning constitutes a distinct kind of computation, incompat-
ible with free energy minimization – though they are sometimes taken to be consistent with each
other (e.g. Da Costa et al., 2020, fig. 3 p. 11).
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stopping, after looking at scenery from a moving train, the world is perceived as
moving but does not change its position.” We do not know of any computational
cognitive science work that explicates the sense of ‘generalised coordinates’ and
confirms whether the phenomenological evidence described by the authors in fact
supports their claims.
Empirical claims include negative claims. For example, Friston (2009, p. 298)
states “there is no electrophysiological or psychophysical evidence to suggest that
the brain can encode multimodal approximations”. He uses this as evidence for
a positive claim about the mathematical features of distributions the brain does
encode, on his view. Again, this is the kind of claim on which computational
cognitive scientists could weigh in.
Several other empirical claims, said to be derivable by applying active infer-
ence models to real systems, are listed by Da Costa et al. (2020, Table 1 pp. 3-4).
During the last decade, the rate at which these hypotheses have been formulated
has outpaced the ability of independent evaluators to determine whether they can
be substantiated or not. Proponents will point to a long list of citations, but the
complexity of the mathematics makes determining the relevant empirical evidence
difficult. We need computational cognitive science to determine what kinds of ev-




General claims are highly abstract or generalized empirical claims. This includes
empirical claims whose scope is very wide, perhaps ranging over every organism
or biological system.
When formulated as a claim about real populations, Hamilton’s rule fits this
description. This is a general claim because its scope is so wide: it applies to every
population of genes subject to selective forces, stating conditions under which a
gene influencing behaviour that impacts the fitness of social partners would be
promoted by selection.
General claims abstract from empirical claims. Empirical claims can therefore
be derived by replacing abstract terms with concrete cases. For example, Hamil-
ton’s rule could be related to specific empirical claims by replacing the abstract
notion of ‘a gene for cooperative behaviour’ with a specific gene, and replacing the
terms for cost, benefit and relatedness with estimated values for real populations
(Bourke, 2014).
Because proponents of active inference often move swiftly between the math-
ematical framework and real systems, some general claims have been given the
label ‘the free energy principle’. For example,
The free-energy principle discussed here is not a consequence of ther-
modynamics but arises from population dynamics and selection. Put
simply, systems with a low free-energy will be selected over systems
with a higher free-energy.
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Friston and Stephan (2007, p. 451)
It seems that “systems” here are real systems such as organisms. But sometimes
the exposition of the principle blurs the lines between mathematical and general
claims. For example, Hohwy says that “FEP [the free energy principle] moves a
priori – via conceptual analysis and mathematics – from existence to notions of
rationality (Bayesian inference) and epistemology (self-evidencing). [...] [T]his
a priori aspect is central to how we should assess FEP” (Hohwy, 2020, p. 8);
later continuing: “FEP says organisms “must” minimise free energy [... this] is
a ‘must’ of conceptual analysis and mathematics, for that is all that was needed
to arrive at FEP. FEP is therefore rightly called a ‘principle’ rather than a law of
nature” (Hohwy, 2020, p. 8) (for Hohwy, a principle is something that may or may
not hold of a given system). By deducing a statement about real organisms from
mathematical premises, Hohwy seems to be overriding the distinction between
mathematical and general categories. In contrast, Andrews distinguishes them
while allowing that the free energy principle has both mathematical and general
aspects:
Not unlike Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection,
the free energy principle can be interpreted alternatively as mathe-
matical model or as meta-theoretical framework; [...] It is only as its
constituent variables are mapped onto measureable, observable (or in-
ferable, latent) processes in the world that it attains genuine explana-
tory power, and becomes capable of generating testable hypotheses.
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Andrews (2017, p. 14)
Whether or not there is a claim deserving the title of the free energy principle,
and whether or not it is really mathematical or general, is moot: what matters is
that there is a mathematical claim – something akin to FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE
(SELECTION), but formulated in a more complex mathematical setting – and there
is a corresponding general claim. Given this, they ought to be evaluated separately.
The distinction between general and empirical claims is not sharp. An em-
pirical claim that generalizes over a species or a class of biological systems may
not be broad enough to deserve being called general, but a claim that generalizes
over entire kingdoms may well be. The point of distinguishing the categories is
to highlight the different kinds of justification that each type of claim requires.
Empirical claims may be made plausible by scientific modelling and wide gen-
eralisations, but they can only be ultimately validated through evidence. General
claims can also be made plausible by modelling, but can only be fully validated
by confirmation of the empirical claims they entail.
The most pressing philosophical issues about general claims are familiar from
the literature on scientific models. The models involved in these claims are typ-
ically extremely abstract, and a common refrain regarding biological systems is
that models which attempt to explain everything end up explaining nothing. This
line of thought is often cashed out in terms of trade-offs between generality, re-
alism and precision. In particular, drawing on Levins’ work, it is thought that
maximising the generality of a model will require sacrifices in terms of realism
and/or precision (Levins, 1966; Weisberg, 2006). Realism, or accuracy, is typ-
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ically understood in terms of the amount of causal structure that a model rep-
resents. Consequently, the more target systems a model encompasses (i.e. the
more general it is) the less accurately it represents them. Precision is understood
in statistical terms, as the closeness of repeated measurements of some quantity.
Consequently, as a model’s parameters become more finely specified, the num-
ber of systems which lie outside those parameters increases (i.e. the less general
it is). So it looks as though the free energy principle will be useful for building
highly general models that will score low on realism and/or precision. Levins’
work is normally thought to deliver a pragmatic lesson: we cannot produce one
model to rule them all, so which trade-off you make should be relativized to your
aims. For instance, models that score highly on realism – and thus capture a lot of
the causal structure of a system – will be better for predicting the effects of some
intervention.
In their contribution, Colombo and Palacios take up this line of critique
(Colombo and Palacios, 2021). On their analysis, the free energy principle’s
“...foundations in concepts and mathematical representations from physics allow
free energy theorists to build models that are applicable to theoretically any (bi-
ological) system” (p. 19). However, “...achieving this generality comes at the
cost of minimal biological realism, as those models fail to accurately capture any
real-world factor for most biological systems” (p. 19).
If all this is right, then it suggests that the usefulness of models produced by ac-
tive inference will be importantly restricted (Brown et al., 2020). These concerns
speak also to the practicality and disciplinary scope of the free energy principle. If
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its utility lies in its ability to provide a general theory of biological processes, but
what working biologists need are models high on precision and/or realism, then
its application will be confined to theoretical and philosophical aspects of biol-
ogy. If, however, it can deliver the latter type of models, then it will have potential
implications for biology in practice. On the other hand, proponents of active in-
ference might simply reject the terms of the trade-off outlined above. Bhat and
colleagues’ contribution to this Topical Collection takes this line. Unifying psy-
chiatric disorders and immune responses using the free energy framework has, in
their view, consequences for the treatment of disorders such as schizophrenia and
Cushing’s syndrome (Bhat et al., 2021).
4.2 Justificatory links between dialectic categories
4.2.1 How can mathematical claims justify empirical claims?
Brain structures posited by empirical claims are often related to properties of artifi-
cial neural networks. As mentioned above, computational cognitive neuroscience
is the branch of cognitive science dedicated to constructing scientific neural mod-
els and evaluating their biological plausibility. Scholars have long appealed to
scientific models originally produced in the context of machine learning to ex-
plain biological facts (Dayan et al., 1995).
At this point, a few remarks about the relationship between machine learn-
ing and neuroscience are in order. Machine learning intersects with neuroscience
in at least two distinct ways. First, large datasets derived from experiments and
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measurements can be processed and analysed using machine learning techniques.
In this regard, the relationship between the two fields is no different than that
between machine learning and any other branch of science that generates large
datasets that need to be processed efficiently. Call this the general relationship.
In contrast, there is a unique connection between machine learning in the context
of neural network models and neuroscience. There is a substantial body of scien-
tific and philosophical work dedicated to the question of correspondence between
scientific neural models and actual neural systems, i.e. biological brains. This re-
lationship is familiar to philosophers of mind and cognitive science, with its roots
in connectionism of the 1980s. Because these issues are unique to the relationship
between machine learning and neuroscience, call it the special relationship.
With regard to the free energy principle, what we are interested in is the spe-
cial relationship. Whether scientific neural models can explain brain functioning
depends in large part on how well those models correspond to biological brains.
This is the remit of computational cognitive neuroscience. In general, justifying
empirical claims by appealing to a scientific model requires critical evaluation of
how good the model is. This is the remit of both scientists and philosophers of
science.
The mathematical −→ empirical direction invites philosophical analysis due to
novel interpretations of scientific model terms. For example, in active inference
it is claimed that the same term p can be interpreted as representing both prob-
abilities and preferences. Mathematically there is nothing stopping this, but the
problem comes when we seek the real entity that corresponds to that term in the
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real world. Is it possible for a component of a neural system to represent probabil-
ities and preferences at the same time? It is not even clear that this is what is being
claimed, because some proponents takes a deflationary or instrumentalist stance
on active inference models, disclaiming the requirement that mathematical terms
map neatly onto components of real systems. It remains an open question whether
this instrumentalist stance is justified merely because the scientific model (or map)
does reflect all variables in the target system (territory). For example, in the phi-
losophy of science literature about model construction some (e.g. Williamson,
2017) suggest that scientific model building is entirely consistent with scientific
realism. This is a discussion still to be had in the active inference literature.
Typically biologists and computational cognitive neuroscientists are more mod-
est than proponents of active inference. In mainstream science, models are often
presented with caveats about their idealised nature and indications of how their
realism can be improved. In contrast, it sometimes seems as though proponents
of active inference take their scientific models to be definitionally accurate. Ac-
tive inference doesn’t get a free pass on model validation. Its proponents almost
certainly know this, but an outsider reading the literature might wonder why their
dialectic slips so easily between claims about scientific models and claims about
real systems. We think it is because the need for justification has not been suf-
ficiently emphasised. This is probably a cultural accident rather than genuine
overconfidence.
Consider an example from the active inference literature. In a discussion of
techniques the brain might be using to minimize variational free energy, Da Costa
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et al. (2020, p. 10) assert that “the marginal free energy currently stands as the
most biologically plausible.” It is not clear how the reasons they cite lead to that
conclusion. It seems that marginal free energy minimization is the most accurate
technique for which there is a known neural implementation (that is, a neural net-
work model whose dynamics are at least consistent with what is observed in the
brain). But it is not clear why we should believe the brain employs the most accu-
rate technique. It is also not clear whether consistency provides strong evidence in
favour of biological plausibility. Sometimes Friston describes a scientific model
as biologically plausible just because it is a neural network model. Again, com-
putational cognitive science can weigh in on the question of what makes a neural
network model of cognition more or less plausible.
Finally, although the justificatory link in question concerns the special rela-
tionship between machine learning and brains, some of Friston’s work is squarely
within the general relationship. For example, his proposals about “variational fil-
tering” (Friston, 2008) are engineering techniques for building machine-learning
systems. These systems would be used to process data from neuroimaging stud-
ies. The important aspects of these proposals lie with the data-processing abilities
of the engineered system, not any correspondence there may be between such sys-
tems and biological brains. It might be the case that Friston’s claims pertaining to
the special relationship were inspired by or otherwise related to his earlier work
developing such techniques. But more premises are needed to support claims of
correspondence between a brain and a scientific neural model, beyond the mere
fact that one was inspired by the other. After all, connectionism was itself inspired
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by neuroscientific discovery of brain structure, but this did not automatically ren-
der connectionism a viable explanatory framework.
4.2.2 How can mathematical claims justify general claims?
When it comes to justifying the active inference framework, emphasis is usually
placed on FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE (SELECTION). For example, Ramstead et al.
(2018) assert:
The FEP is a mathematical formulation that explains, from first prin-
ciples, the characteristics of biological systems that are able to resist
decay and persist over time. It rests on the idea that all biological
systems instantiate a hierarchical generative model of the world that
implicitly minimises its internal entropy by minimising free energy.
Ramstead et al. (2018, p. 2)
To our knowledge, this mathematical claim has not been independently evaluated,
though Aguilera et al. (2021) offer reasons to think the constraints on systems that
satisfy it are more restrictive than proponents of active inference usually assume.
Similarly, it is difficult to evaluate the corresponding general claim because there
is not enough understanding of the mathematical theorem and how it maps onto
real systems. Recently, however, Beni (2021) and Bruineberg et al. (2021) have
critiqued the framework on grounds of its applicability to real systems. We are
starting to see critical analysis of active inference from outside the tradition. This
is a healthy development.
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The analogy with Hamilton’s rule can help illuminate the situation. Hamilton’s
rule as a mathematical statement is reasonably simple and relatively easy to prove
within a given mathematical framework. Variations on the rule can be clearly
defined mathematically because of the precision offered by formalism. Interesting
questions arise when it comes to using the rule, or its variations, to explain the
evolution of social behaviour. But its relative simplicity enables philosophers to
understand the basic components of Hamilton’s rule and what the rule says, even
though there are still interpretive questions to ask (Birch, 2014).
Constant’s contribution to this Topical Collection uses a mathematical claim
to make a general claim. On the basis of a “numerical example”, he argues against
the claim that minimising free energy entails life. Rather, he believes the converse
is true: life entails minimising free energy (Constant, 2021).
4.2.3 How can general claims justify empirical claims?
Proponents of active inference distinguish process theories (roughly, our cate-
gory of empirical claims) from normative principles (roughly, general claims).
For example, Hohwy (2020) argues that the generalized form of the free energy
principle should be treated as a regulatory principle guiding the construction of
process theories. The idea is to add assumptions about the structure of specific sys-
tems to the general claims in order to yield testable empirical claims. These would
include computational, algorithmic, and implementational claims about brain ac-
tivity. However, Parr and Friston (2017, p. 4) use the phrase “computational archi-
tectures implied by active inference”, which conceals the fact that extra premises
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are required to get from general claims at the core of active inference to empirical
claims about system architectures.
In their contribution Kirchhoff and van Es (2021) are interested in whether or
not active inference can overcome what they call the universal ethology challenge.
Active inference can only unify biology and cognition if low-level biological sys-
tems are explained in terms of inference, but – so the challenge goes – explaining
such systems does not require inference. So active inference cannot unify biology
and cognition. Kirchhoff and van Es disagree with this assessment. They argue
that it is possible to explain chemotaxis in bacteria using inference. They tenta-
tively conclude that this gives us reason to think that active inference might be
able to address the universal ethology challenge.
While Kirchhoff and van Es use an empirical example to motivate a general
claim, Fabry’s contribution uses an empirical example to restrict a general claim
(Fabry, 2021). She distinguishes between three types of niche construction: se-
lective niche construction, developmental niche construction, and organism-niche
coordination dynamics. She then assesses attempts by proponents of extended
active inference (who marry active inference with ideas from extended cognition
research) to account for these various types of niche construction. She concludes
that, while extended active inference is successful in the case of organism-niche




The active inference framework is incredibly ambitious in its explanatory scope.
From humble beginnings as a theory of brain function, it is now positioned as a
framework for understanding life itself. There is a critical tradition in the phi-
losophy of biology, inspired by Levins, with regard to such ambitions. Many,
then, will approach active inference with scepticism. Healthy scepticism is a good
thing, but healthy scepticism is informed scepticism. Unfortunately, getting one’s
head around the details of active inference is no small task.
Our goal in this introduction has been to clarify the basic mathematics, his-
tory and internal dialectics of active inference, and draw attention to some key
concerns. With these details on the table, philosophers of biology are in a better
position to critically evaluate the framework. We look forward with interest to
seeing the results.
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